Venezuela and a new negotiation effort: round #5

The case for the Opposition to agree on participating in this new effort to reach a compromise with the government has more layers. While Maduro is without a doubt an unpopular leader, his coalition has strengthened its grip on power, as the Opposition has deepened its internal grievances and ruptures.

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A new round of negotiations, between the Venezuelan government and a delegation representing the Opposition, is set to start in Mexico this August 13th, with the facilitation of the Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs. The mixed hopes of millions of Venezuelans, at home and abroad, reflect the complexities of the country’s deep crisis, and the many obstacles it faces to overcome the political stalemate. The severity of the humanitarian catastrophe that has been accelerated by the effects of the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic has contributed to a critical situation in which there is no clear path for an immediate resolution.

The political crisis in Venezuela is the consequence of years of failed policies and vast mismanagement. In a commodity-based economy, the oil market’s plummeting threw the nation into further turmoil as it was fighting against the autocratization of a political regime that kept advancing in the severance of its democratic institutions. If this was not enough to paint a dire picture, the Covid-19 pandemic added to the suffering of a population already a victim of the neglect of a government incapable of providing basic health care assistance. This is the background for the fifth attempt to negotiate an agreement that could pave the way for a solution to the political crisis, and thus, the humanitarian catastrophe.

Yet, this is not 2003. Maduro does not have the resources or the popular support to convene a political measure such as a new presidential election or even a referendum, where he would be taking a huge risk with a decision that could end his political run. When Chávez accepted to hold the 2004 recall, he had already started the Social Missions that shielded him from the threat of possible removal from office. In Maduro’s situation, with a dismal 9,5% support, and an overall 25,3% for Chavismo, an electoral match is not likely on the agenda for the time being.

However, this new attempt at outlining a way out of the country’s long-term political crisis does not seem to imply the same for those involved in the negotiations. On the government’s side, the expectation is restricted to talk to the Biden administration and convince them into lifting the economic sanctions, among other related aspirations. Maduro has not been shy in recognizing that the US government made it clear to them that the conduit for any conversation was Juan Guaidó, the former speaker of the National Assembly, who was designated as Interim President after the sham election of 2018. This remains to be the rationale for Maduro’s decision to participate in the talks.

The case for the Opposition to agree on participating in this new effort to reach a compromise with the government has more layers. While Maduro is without a doubt an unpopular leader, his coalition has strengthened its grip on power, as the Opposition has deepened its internal grievances and ruptures. The coalition of lawmakers that won the supermajority of the legislative branch in 2015, disintegrated after the collapse of the political agreements that kept them together, as parts of a diverse body of political parties, following the failed attempts at removing Maduro by other means. The deepening of the distrust among the population is reflected in the most recent polling. Therefore, this new round of talks could be seen as a renewed opportunity for the Opposition to reconvene, not only with a more nuanced approach to engage with the Maduro regime, but also, to build a more sustainable political agenda, based on a coherent set of principles, rather than the enduring promise to end chavismo.

This is an opportunity to rethink the best way to utilize the support the Biden administration is offering in an effort that can lead to concrete steps to improve the current situation the country is facing. Instead of framing this negotiation effort as a trigger for Maduro’s removal, it can be seen as an opportunity to reframe the political narrative of the Opposition. It should be known by now that the departure of Maduro – and of Chavismo itself – is not likely to be achieved at a negotiating table, therefore, it cannot be part of the agenda. If the Opposition seizes the opportunity to regroup and rebuild an inclusive political message, without ignoring the anti-democratic behavior of the adversary, it would be sending a signal of hope to the Venezuelan people.

The White House has changed its tone, following the reckless handling of the former administration regarding the Venezuelan crisis, presenting all parties: Government, Opposition, and International Community, a principled approach to the situation. President Biden brings his experience in the Senate and the Obama administration, as credentials that should send a signal to all sides about this trust in a multilateral diplomatic effort. This is an important piece of information that should guide all the analyses. As opposed to the previous policy toward the Venezuelan crisis, this administration is not engaging in an intervention effort, but the lifting of the economic sanctions does not depend on the demands made by Maduro, but on his compliance with the agenda, which requires a coherent Opposition on the other side.

Although the Maduro government appears to have the upper hand, and their attendance responds to their interest in getting the sanctions removed, the demands about their government’s recognition and access to resources are part of their campaign to restore their capability to continue ransacking the country, which makes it harder for the Biden administration to consider it as a possible outcome of the negotiations absent a change in their behavior. This is going to be a critical aspect of these talks, and the recent findings by the outgoing International Criminal Court Prosecutor, regarding the government’s violation of human rights, are likely going to be a part of the Biden administration’s context in dealing with the Venezuelan government.

Finally, this is not a decision to be made by the Opposition, and after the protests in Cuba, on July 11th, we should expect that domestic politics will pla y an important role in the negotiations, especially as the country heads into the 2022 midterm elections. This is not a short-term process, and as much as facilitators and the international community have the Venezuelan people’s interest as their priority, we shouldn’t expect immediate solutions as an outcome, but there is no doubt that we would all welcome any sign of advance in reaching an agreement that addresses people’s struggles.