Mexico is living through an inflexion point. After two failed attempts, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (or AMLO, the acronym of his full name) was triumphantly elected on July 1, 2018. He received 53% of the votes—obtaining 30 points more than his rival. Moreover, his party won 19 state governorships, secured the majority in the Congress of the Union (its legislative branch), and succeeded in the capital. All of this in an election with high voter turnout: 63%. In summary, an indisputable achievement.
Who is AMLO and where will he take Mexico?
The overwhelming victory aside, it is the first time that a third party achieves the Presidency, the majority control of the Congress, and the state governments. Since its first election in 1929, the PRI held a political hegemony, with a brief alternation with the PAN between 2000 and 2012. Even when the PAN managed to seat two of its standard bearers in the Silla del Águila (Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón), the power of the PRI continued to define many things, and the emergence of the PRD avoided another party hegemony.
On December 1st of last year, five months after his election, López Obrador took office. Throughout 2018, as soon as it became obvious he would win, analysts tried to answer the question of whom he is and what to expect from his government. Some people have compared him to Trump, Chávez or Daniel Ortega. “He’s a leftist and a nationalist,” they argue. Others have focused on his authoritarian nature and have also accused him of being a populist, to which he reacted.
However, neither of these labels seems to fit AMLO’s profile. Those who know his administration as head of government of the Federal District (DF), between December 2000 and July 2005, remember a cautious and pragmatic administrator, inseparable from certain rhetoric, where the poor occupied a preponderant place. The ideologized politician, who has declared his admiration for Fidel Castro, is, at the same time, a promoter of austerity and a guardian of budgets; and both he and his successor in the DF government (his chancellor, Marcelo Ebrard) knew how to maintain a relationship, albeit at times tense, of collaboration with the business sector. Therefore, rather than presuming unfitting comparisons, it is necessary to detect the specificity of López Obrador to anticipate the Mexico’s destiny.
Beyond the electoral labels and slogans, the rise of AMLO to power, along with the immense institutional majority his party obtained, represents the question of whether we are facing the return to a new hegemony. During almost eight decades of PRI supremacy and the following three governments, there had never resurged a government with a nationalist, populist rhetoric, and open economic interventionist vocation, such as Lázaro Cárdenas, who governed until 1940, and Lopez Portillo (1976-1982).
A first look at the chessboard
It’s worth remembering that Mexico occupies a large territory, of almost two million square kilometers, and that it shares more than 3,155 kilometers of border with the United States. It has a population of more than 130 million people, of which about 44%—according to figures provided by the new government—live in poverty. Besides being the second economy in Latin America, after Brazil, it has the most powerful industry in the continent and receives the most tourists. Finally, an indispensable fact: more than 33 million citizens of Mexican origin live in the United States.
López Obrador will face advantages as big as his problems. Two of the latter are deeply associated: corruption—which is massive, and rooted in politics and the exercise of power—, and the violence that axially impacts society. According to the National Institute of Statistics, a staggering 85 people, on average, are murdered every day. Moreover, Mexico leads the rankings of massacres and murdered journalists. And between corruption and homicides, drug trafficking is the communicating vessel and the decisive factor. The journalistic balance of 2018 highlighted the ferocity with which the crimes are committed, as well as the close links between organized crime and a group of the police officers.
In addition to these very serious issues suffering internally, there’s the complex relationship between Mexico and the United States. It has been repeated, with regard to the discussions on the renegotiation already signed with the Trump administration of the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA (now renamed the USMCA Free Trade Agreement) that 80% of Mexican exports are destined for the United States. And, in the opposite direction, 47% of its imports come from the northern neighbor. In fact, Mexico is the second recipient of U.S. exports—after Canada and above China—, with a volume of 243 billion dollars; and it is the second largest supplier of imports from the USA—after China and above Canada—, with a volume of 317 billion dollars. And, beyond trade, remittances from the United States represent around 2.7% of Mexico’s GDP: 33 billion dollars. This represents, for example, more than Venezuela’s oil exports at this time and more than double the exports of several Latin American countries.
US direct investment in Mexico amounts to 110 billion dollars; conversely, the Mexican in the US reaches 18 billion, including Mexican “multilatinas,” which have the first market shares in industrial or food sectors. There are, therefore, historical, demographic and economic, fundamental and daily links between the two countries. Whether the xenophobes want it or not, an important section of the Southwest area and the West Coast of the United States is impregnated with Mexican culture. This comes to no surprise since an immense portion of the current US territory belonged to Mexico for a good part of its history. If the US market constitutes the “big leagues” that everyone, including China, wants to have access to, Mexico is undoubtedly a global champion in those struggles, from which the US can hardly do without the chains of interdependence and strategic alliance that define its economy. In fact, this powerful alliance in the last two decades has halted growth and reversed the trend of migration of undocumented workers from Mexico to the US. Even for a while, more Mexicans returned to their country than entered the US undocumented, according to the studies of the prestigious PEW Center of Washington DC.
To better understand US-Mexico relations we increase our framework to include Trump’s anti-immigration policy, and, as a factor of conjuncture, the five caravans. Coming from the same number of countries, but mainly from Honduras, the caravans add to about ten thousand travelers, whose goal is to enter the United States. Mexico has allowed them to enter its territory through the border with Guatemala and has given them some support. However, in the other countries involved, not only in the United States, there are conflicting views on how to proceed. The world press has observed that, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and even Nicaragua, hundreds of thousands of citizens see the possibility of joining the next caravans to escape criminal gangs, irremediable poverty, and, in short, from economies that do not offer prospects for progress. López Obrador has announced that he will create a program to grant work visas to Central American migrants. He has also urged the United States to invest in those countries to create sources of work that contribute to the solution of the problem at its root. The new president is not devoid of political intelligence. At the insistence of Trump with the construction of the wall, like his predecessor, President Peña Nieto, AMLO does not respond to tweets or statements from his American colleague.
To these titanic challenges, and the opportunities they entail, we add the fall in oil production. The intention was to reverse, during the past six years, this trend with a policy of openness to the private sector. Now, it remains uncertain whether or not this project will be completed due to the rise of AMLO; the increasing denunciations about the deterioration of the octogenarian Pemex (the Mexican oil company); the multiple complaints of indigenous communities; the increasingly loud accusations regarding the destruction of the environment; the promises and expectations that López Obrador’s campaign generated in the poorest sectors; and many others.
The fourth revolution
López Obrador calls himself the leader of the fourth revolution in Mexican history. The first one, its Independence; followed by the liberal reforms of XIX, and the bloody Mexican Revolution that killed between 2 and 3 million people. Now, the fourth one aims towards a “radical transformation” of Mexico. Many fear the strong messianic tone in his discourse.
López Obrador’s first actions reveal he remains an enigma. It was not the messianic AMLO, who had historically denounced the NAFTA, but the pragmatic one who participated directly in the team that worked on the trade agreement’s ratification. That pragmatist chose ministers with a high technical profile and career diplomats in embassies and multilateral organizations. He has also promised to end public officials’ impunity—a cry throughout the country.
Among the many announcements in his long inaugural speech, on December 1st, it is worth highlighting some elements. Surprisingly, he announced a policy to forgive past corruption crimes and giving everyone a clean sleigh. His argument is not that of a vigilante but of a pure pragmatist: if he tried to prosecute all those involved in corruption, there would be neither a judicial system nor sufficient jails. His approach assumes that the fight against corruption will not be retroactive, but from now on. He also stated that following the drug money route is more important than pursuing the drug lords, which seems like a step towards a possible pacification program. However—although he was often critical of the strategies against drug trafficking and declared that the military forces had to be removed from the streets (he repeated that the bullets should not be fought with more bullets)—, he announced the creation of a military/police force, integrated by 50 thousand officials, who will report directly to him. His message to the armed forces of Mexico was fraught with ambiguity: he asked them for help, that he had to wait for the approval of Congress, but that, if necessary, he would consult the citizens. In other words, it would seem that sooner or later he would impose his criteria to militarize the country to respond to drug trafficking and citizen insecurity.
In five weeks of government, López Obrador has made major announcements and launched a policy to reactivate the oil industry, essential for the country’s economic recovery. In 2012, revenues from the oil industry represented 40% of GDP, while in 2017 they barely reached 17%. López Obrador starred in the construction of the Dos Bocas refinery in Tabasco, and declared that it will invest more than $ 3.7 billion to increase production. Surprisingly, although difficult to explain due to a lack of details, he proposes to achieve this without increasing the debt, raising taxes, or increasing fuel prices. He trusts that the reduction of expenses and the drastic decline in corruption will provide the resources.
The importance of the decree that increased salaries by 16.21%, starting on January 1, is economic and political. In addition to boosting consumption capacity, López Obrador scored a bit: he added the support of unions and businessmen alike. He also decreed an imaginative economic plan for the entire border strip along the United States, where he doubled the salary increase, reduced the value-added tax from 16 to 8% and undertook to moderate the burden of income taxes from 30 to 20%.
Reason for concern
Still, along with these positive messages there have been other unsettling ones. He appealed to popular consultations, irrelevant in terms of participation and not supervised by the National Electoral Institute, to support his decision to cancel the construction of the new airport in Mexico City and approve a railway route that will link the southern part of the country with the Gulf of Mexico. This arbitrary, irregular, and unilateral use of the resource of direct consultation, has ignited the alarms of businessmen, political opponents, analysts, media, and human rights defenders, who see in these methods the clear image of an authoritarian ruler, denied to a genuine dialogue.
This is not an isolated event. A series of actions begin to add to the undemocratic record of López Obrador, who has banned criticism within his party. He has shown intolerance and prompt disqualification towards those who oppose him. Furthermore, he has announced interest in obtaining the medical services that Cuba has been providing Venezuela, Brazil and Nicaragua, which is tantamount to providing financial assistance to the Cuban regime. He has also shown a strong tendency to establish friend-enemy logic in his analysis of reality. Finally, he has not hidden his intention to establish direct links with the people without the mediation of the institutions, determining that the distribution of aid to poor families would come directly from the Presidency. A remake of the practices of the late Hugo Chávez Frías, who at the time, by the way, pronounced a phrase reissued by López Obrador: “I’m not me anymore. I do not belong to myself any longer.” At the very least, a worrying evocation.
The promise of resurgence of the heroes of his country is alarming in the voice of a man who has committed to transform his country throughout the six years from 2018 to 2024. What happens in Mexico will have consequences for the Trump’s migration and commercial policy towards Central America. Specially, towards the so-called “northern triangle,” made up of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Events in Mexico could also affect the balance of the region, where several countries of the continent are pressing for Nicaragua and Venezuela to get off the path of destruction in which they are trapped. AMLO’s foreign policy seems to return the Estrada doctrine, which since 1930—with the exception of recent years—establishes that Mexico does not issue an assessment or judgment on the internal affairs of other countries.
AMLO remains unresolved
AMLO remains, in short, unresolved. An enigma that cannot be dispatched with easy formulas or similarities to other leaders, no matter how many indications there are. It is a riddle counterpart to another atypical president: Donald Trump. Until now, despite the provocations and after having overcome a strong commercial impasse, the relationship between the two leaders continues without traumas. I hope it carries on that way. In relation to Latin American foreign policy, there’s no doubt that he will lead a neutral government; but with sympathies able to oxygenate the Cuban regime, and neutrality that gives license to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan authoritarianism. Although, perhaps for that reason it can serve as a link in the articulation of dialogues for change in these countries. Conclusively, there are many unknowns; but that does not change the weight of Mexico on the hemisphere. The US foreign policy should thus value the country, beyond the rhetoric and the agenda on the immigration issue that, of course, also requires a profound revision and greater cooperation between both nations.