Let’s start by remembering the historic episode that gave Bolivia its name, after years being known as Elevated Peru. The country’s Independence was proclaimed on August 6, 1825, disobeying the Spanish authorities. Five days later, the Deliberative Assembly gathered to approve the Law of Recognitions and Honors to the Liberators, which established in the Article 1 that the State would be named “República de Bolívar”, or Bolívar’s Republic. It also designated Simon Bolívar “Father of the Republic”, in addition to Protector and President. (Later that year, on December 29, Bolívar handed the seat to Marshal Antonio José de Sucre.) The presbyter and theologian Manuel Martín Cruz, representative for the department of Potosí, authored the proposal with an unforgettable, witty phrase: “Of Romulo, Rome. Of Bolívar, Bolivia.”
On February 7, 2009, a new Constitution came into effect; approved by a little over 61% of the voters. This new Law abandoned the concept of Republic to adopt that of Plurinational State. Bolivia became the Plurinational State of Bolivia: “In compliance with the provisions of the Political Constitution of the State, all public and private events, international diplomatic relations, and official national and international correspondence must use the following denomination, Plurinational State of Bolivia.”
Among the fundamental issues contained in its 411 articles, the text recognizes the “original indigenous peasant nations and peoples.” In article 5, other 36 languages corresponding to each of these peoples are defined as official languages, in addition to Castilian Spanish. In essence, the 2009 Constitution proclaimed indigenous peoples as subjects of law.
After a little over a decade since the Constitution came into effect, many ask themselves whether the changes that the campaign in favor of the new constitutional text promised have occurred.
A growing economy
As reported by the World Bank, Bolivia heads the growth rates in South America since 2006; above Peru and Paraguay, the other economies in the region that stand out because of their positive indicators. Between 2006 and 2017, Bolivia’s growth reached an average of 4.9%. In 2013, it surprisingly grew to 6.8%, later decreasing to 4.3% in 2016. Then, in 2017 and 2018, growth has remained 4.2%. Towards the end of last February, Luis Arce, the Minister of the Economy, shared the governmental prognostics for 2019: 4.5% growth and 4% inflation. This means that, in general terms, Bolivia’s economic development will endure and that the country will continue to advance against the global economic slowdown, along with Dominican Republic, Panama, and Peru.
Minister Arce announced what many were waiting for: “We will continue to be the country that invests the most; the State will continue to be the economic growth engine.” Indeed, analysts agree that the good performance is due to a combination of factors. The two most relevant are a sustained State investment program and a very cautious public spending, which is meritorious and distinguishes the government of Evo Morales from that of other populists.
After nationalizing hydrocarbons in 2006—which provoked strong reactions that foreshadowed the decline and disaster of the Bolivian oil industry—, the government renegotiated contracts with all companies, considerably increasing its revenues. The IDH (Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons) was a turning point for many Bolivians.
Another fact worth mentioning, especially when compared to the conduct of other administrations in the region, points to the administration’s saving strategies. These strategies were implemented along with State investments (an example that investments and saving can coexist). A BBC World report recounts that, between 2007 and 2013, Bolivia increased its financial “cushion” from $7 billion to $20 billion. These resources have allowed Bolivia to face the difficulties of falling prices of raw materials and, in particular, of hydrocarbons. These pitfalls, in the case of Bolivia, are twofold: due to the drop in oil prices and because the slump in the economies of Brazil and Argentina impacts Bolivian exports.
Despite this, exports of liquefied petroleum gas and natural gas to Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil turned Bolivia into the region’s chief exporter. That’s correct: a country that until 2013 imported liquefied petroleum gas has become an exporter. This expansion includes entering the urea and ammonia markets, which strengthen the Bolivian portfolio. Efforts to diversify the economy have not been limited to specific items such as tin, diesel, and soy (the latter with important customers in Peru and Colombia). Additionally, some agricultural products have experienced significant production increases.
Still, there is more to be done for poverty and income inequality reduction
The National Statistics Institute has determined that, between 2006 and 2017, poverty reduced from 59.9 to 36.4%. Since then, different sources, including ECLAC, caution there has been a hard stop to this indicator’s improvements. Around 35% of Bolivians have not found a way to improve their standards of living. Moreover, 19% live below undernourished conditions—according to the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report.
At the same time, the economic boom has increased inequality. Around 30% of the population has been enriched, while the remaining 70% has not experienced an improvement. According to official figures, 393 thousand children still work. Poverty among the indigenous population is significantly greater: Dr. Fernanda Wanderley, from the Bolivian Catholic University, has indicated that, in 2017, 47.24% were in moderate poverty and 23.91% in extreme poverty.
This academic has warned that the model instrumented since 2005 and the so-called “Bolivian miracle” are based on a partial look at the indicators. The GDP is not the best indicator to measure the facts, because it hides matters such as growth in informal sectors, destruction of water sources, generalized depredation of the environment, and, most importantly, reissue of an economic model based on the exploitation and export of raw materials, which is highly dependent on the high and low price cycles of international markets.
Abuse in the High Court
In this context of trends, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, whose population is 11.4 million inhabitants, distributed in a territory of almost 1.1 million square kilometers, is heading for the electoral process on October 20.
Evo Morales has been governing Bolivia since 2005. According to the Article 168 in the Constitution in force, the president can only be reelected once. In order for Morales to become president for the third time in a row, he appealed to the Constitutional Court, which, in a decision that openly contradicted the constitutional mandate, authorized the nomination of Morales.
This phenomenon in high courts—emitting sentences against what is established in the Constitution and laws—is a tendency sprouting around Latin America. In most cases, these decisions guarantee impunity or prolong power. This matter demands a thorough analysis, since the judicial powers are not acting to guarantee the compliance of the law, but to facilitate the interests of certain political leaders and projects. This practice, it must be said, undermines the foundations of democracy and the rule of law.
Once in power, for the third time, Morales held a referendum in February 2016 to seek approval to run for a fourth term. To the question, “Do you agree with the reform of Article 168 of the Political Constitution of the State, so the State’s president and vice president could be reelected twice continuously?” 51.3% of the voters responded No, surprisingly. The analysis of these results show there is an overwhelming rejection of reelection, especially in some large cities and among Bolivians who live abroad. In December 2018, after intense and controversial debates, the Constitutional Court, again, authorized the candidacy of Morales, who aspires to govern until 2025.
The case of Evo Morales has had repercussions worth remembering. One, very significant, came from the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Luis Almagro. After the referendum, on September 22, 2017, Almagro tweeted: “Evo Morales must respect the popular decision that said NO to the reelection. No judge can overwrite the opinion of the only sovereign: the people.” However, on May 17, 2019, he gave a 180 degree turn and wrote: “To say that Evo Morales cannot participate today would be absolutely discriminatory with the other presidents that have participated in electoral processes, on the basis of a judicial ruling recognizing the guarantee of his human rights.” This portrays that, even in the leadership of the OAS, very “flexible” criteria can prevail when it comes to the evaluation of democratic fundamentals. According to this, above the popular vote and the laws, comes the superior good and more weightily “human right” to eternalize in power.
the cult of Evo Morales
In addition to some accusations—related to corruption cases—in course, the apparition and consolidation of a very powerful oligarchy surrounding the government, and the destruction of the autonomy among authoritative powers and practices ever more evident, there is another strategy similar to the case of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela: the desire to impose a political culture based on the cult of Evo Morales. The media and political sectors immediately reacted to a children’s book edited by the Ministry of Communications, which included two stories, “Evito goes to school” and “Evito plays soccer.”
The example of the Museum of Democratic and Cultural Revolution in Orinoca, which began construction in 2006 and was inaugurated in February 2017, is also emblematic. Located in the far away town where Evo Morales was born, it is dedicated to praise him as a hero. The collection exhibited is composed, mostly, of artifacts of Morales’s life—shirts, notebooks, ponchos, photos, etc. In fact, the clothes he wore the day he was inaugurated president was declared patrimony of Bolivia. One wall exhibits 18 jerseys from different soccer teams from around world that have the privilege to be admired by Morales. There is no shortage of life-size sculptures of him. This nonsense is, to say the least, paradoxical: the museum’s modern construction, which cost between 7 and 9 million dollars, is located in a town of 680 inhabitants with precarious dirt roads and adobe houses, most of which do not have potable water.
Whatever happens in the elections in October could be decisive for the future of Bolivians. Most likely, as we approach the date, there will be a polarization between Morales—so far leading the polls—and Carlos Mesa, the main opposition candidate. When analyzing Bolivia’s file, is inevitable to recognize the contradiction between what started as an interesting case of democratic empowering of the indigenous majorities, and the neoautoritary drift that has been going on for a while. Another contrast the jumps out when compared to its twin experiment in Venezuela, given that Evo has maintained a successful economic performance. Although, perhaps these corruption sprouts will contaminate it to the point of joining the dangerous kleptocratic shift of the Venezuelan regime. Finally, except for his open support for Nicolás Maduro’s regime and the thorny drug trafficking matter that impacts much of the region, the relationship with the United States, beyond rhetoric, has been maintained in terms in which the Evo’s leadership has not become a priority problem for the northern country. Both countries coexist in tense calm.
The next presidential term will define whether Bolivia persists in the path of the same power—with at least 20 years of Morales—, or if it takes the democratic route of alternating power. The decision, fortunately, is still in the hands of Bolivian voters. It will dawn and we will see.