This interview is credited to Venezuelan journalist Ascension Reyes and was originally published in Spanish by El Tiempo in Venezuela. With their approval, we are collaborating to publish this work in English
Leopoldo Martínez Nucete, Venezuelan lawyer and former Senior Advisor to the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2024 under President Joe Biden, warns of the “emergency situation” created internally in the U.S. for thousands of migrants—including Venezuelans—who have been deported to El Salvador without due process.
Martínez Nucete asserts that there is a constitutional and public powers crisis in the U.S. However, he notes that checks and balances against these discriminatory actions by the Trump administration are in motion. As an example, he cites the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on Saturday, April 19, to temporarily halt the deportation of another group of Venezuelans. Additionally, this week, a Federal Court will order the arrest of officials who disobey court orders. A group of organizations is also expected to file a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), classifying these deportations as “cross-border forced disappearances.”
Martínez Nucete, founder of the Center for Democracy and Development in the Americas, emphasized that remittances from the U.S. to Venezuela amount to approximately $4 billion. However, this figure could decline due to the conflict arising from the Trump administration’s escalating restrictions on Venezuelan migrants who are being pressured to leave the U.S. as soon as possible, and the fears inflicted on migrants after the case of Venezuelans being transferred to a detention center in El Salvador.
Q: Recently, another group of Venezuelans was sent to El Salvador under accusations of belonging to the “Tren de Aragua.” Is there a way to stop these deportations?
Yes. In fact, the Supreme Court, responding to an emergency request in the early hours of Saturday, April 19, temporarily halted the deportation of another group of Venezuelans under the Alien Enemies Act for violating due process previously ordered by the Court. It ruled that the legal recourse is individual—via habeas corpus—in the appropriate jurisdiction according to the location of each detainee, not a general temporary halt to deportations as ordered by Judge James Boasberg of the Federal Court.
As a result, attorneys from the ACLU have initiated habeas corpus actions in Texas and New York on behalf of certain migrants and have requested certification of those actions as class actions. Much remains to be done, but the Supreme Court and Federal Courts have remained steadfast in requiring due process in deportations. The case of Salvadoran deportee Kilmar Abrego García also sets a precedent for Venezuelan deportees in similar situations. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the due process requirement and ordered the Trump administration to release him from the mega-prison CECOT in El Salvador and return him to the U.S. So far, the Trump administration is defying that order, but last week, the Federal Court in DC announced it will issue arrest warrants for officials who fail to comply. There is a constitutional crisis and a power struggle underway.
Q: The same ruling allows affected individuals to appeal, but no timeline was set. Are they in legal limbo?
The affected individuals have the right to file habeas corpus petitions. The problem is that both the U.S. and Salvadoran governments are refusing to disclose who is being detained, leaving them defenseless. The ACLU, the Center for Democracy and Development in the Americas, Cristosal (a human rights NGO in Central America), and the Venezuelan American Caucus have exhausted available avenues for human rights and migrant defense organizations. They are preparing a request to the IACHR, characterizing these actions as “cross-border forced disappearances”—a classification also supported by Human Rights Watch.
Q: On March 11, Venezuelans who entered via the CBP One app were given seven days to leave the U.S. Can they appeal this decision?
Those notices were mainly sent to recipients of Humanitarian Parole. However, the Federal Court in Boston—responding to a case brought by our coalition—ordered that the rights of Parole recipients must be respected for the duration of their permits. Thus, those with Parole cannot be deported. Asylum seekers who entered using the CBP One app also have individual legal remedies available to them.
U.S. Policy on Venezuela
Q: Regarding Venezuela, which U.S. policy stance is prevailing—Marco Rubio’s “maximum pressure” approach or Rick Grenell’s more pragmatic line?
We’re seeing a power struggle within the Trump administration between two equally harmful positions for Venezuela’s future and for Venezuelan migrants. U.S. policy toward Venezuela should include incentives for democratic transition and humane treatment of Venezuelan migrants. Currently, both are missing. Maximum economic pressure has coincided with a baseless criminalization of migrants, including the appalling detentions in El Salvador.
Last week, Representative Joaquín Castro of Texas obtained confirmation from the CIA and U.S. intelligence agencies that the Trump administration’s political narrative about the “Tren de Aragua,” used to invoke the Alien Enemies Act, is unfounded. The Washington Post expanded on this story last week, following earlier reporting by the New York Times from leaked intelligence documents.
Q: In a radio interview, you mentioned the economic consequences of declining remittances to Venezuela. How much does the country receive through that channel?
Official estimates place remittances at over $4 billion. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimated $2.5 billion in 2023. But I’m certain the real number is much higher. Venezuela’s economy is dollarized, and many remittances and payments happen through apps like Zelle. These transactions aren’t technically considered remittances because they don’t leave the U.S., and thus are never recorded.
Q: Should Venezuela negotiate directly with the U.S., like other countries, to reduce or eliminate tariffs on non-traditional exports?
Venezuela’s case is more complex due to Trump-era global tariff policies. These include secondary sanctions on buyers of Venezuelan oil. It would be unfortunate if the only outcome is an oil normalization deal in exchange for deportations. Negotiations between Venezuelans for a democratic transition must also be on the table. The fraud in the July 28 presidential election cannot go unchallenged—one consequence must be progress toward a negotiated political transition. Sanctions and pressure alone will not yield political change and will only worsen conditions for Venezuela’s private sector and general population.
Q: Could Venezuela achieve “liberation” by increasing exports to allies like China, Russia, and Iran?
Revoking oil licenses for U.S. and European companies like Chevron, Repsol, and ENI would be highly damaging. It would deepen the black market for Venezuelan oil with China, causing steep export discounts, and open the door to China, Russia, Iran, and their partnerships with Venezuela’s kleptocracy, which has rooted massive corruption in PDVSA. I don’t see “liberation” coming through that route. That’s why the Trump administration must rethink what Secretary of State Marco Rubio is doing.
Q: How damaging is the cancellation of gas development projects with transnational companies that were planned with Trinidad?
Russia is the main beneficiary. This project is crucial not only for Venezuela’s future but for Europe’s energy needs as an alternative to Russian energy. It’s especially important given the context and potential consequences of the war in Ukraine.
Q: Can Chevron appeal PDVSA’s suspension of oil shipments before the May 27 deadline?
I assume Chevron’s priority is renewing its license and securing time to protect its investments and assets in Venezuela. The recent shipment issue likely stems from the Trump administration, through OFAC, setting a deadline of April 2 for Chevron and other licensed companies to complete all financial transactions with PDVSA, even though they technically have until May 27 to wind down operations under the current license.
Link to the original Interview by Ascensión Reyes from Caracas for el Tiempo