The 2026 legislative elections could become a turning point for U.S. policy toward Venezuela. Not because Venezuela is a central issue capable of defining the electoral outcome, but because several internal factors in American politics could converge over Caracas: Donald Trump’s political weakness, a possible Democratic advance in the House of Representatives, the possibility —more difficult, but highly relevant— of a change in control of the Senate, the conflict with Iran, energy prices, pressure on Cuba, oil licenses, the candidates positioning themselves for the Republican succession in 2028, and the increasingly visible role of Marco Rubio. At that intersection of interests, Venezuela could cease to be treated mainly as a case of democratic restoration and instead become a central piece in a narrative of stabilization, energy security, and hemispheric realignment.
If current polls hold, Democrats have a real possibility of retaking the House of Representatives, and a more remote but still possible chance of also regaining control of the Senate. A Democratic margin of around five points on the generic party ballot —according to polling averages— indicates a very adverse national environment for Republicans. Trump also faces a decisive majority disapproval rating and especially weak numbers on the economy, inflation, the cost of living, and Iran.
A Democratic House of Representatives —even one accompanied by Democratic control of the Senate— would not allow Congress to direct Venezuela policy from Capitol Hill. Foreign policy, sanctions licenses, recognition decisions, and energy diplomacy would remain in the hands of the executive branch. But it could significantly raise the political cost of every decision and, by doing so, push events toward a different path. House committees under Democratic control could investigate OFAC licenses, access granted to oil companies, the handling of Venezuelan revenues, arrangements involving CITGO, conversations with Delcy Rodríguez, and the real degree of democratic conditionality behind any sanctions relief. The central question would become unavoidable: is Washington promoting a democratic transition, or merely managing economic normalization under authoritarian continuity?
That dilemma becomes sharper because of the conflict with Iran. If the situation in the Middle East continues to pressure oil prices, gasoline prices, or perceptions of foreign-policy incompetence, Venezuela gains additional value for Trump. Not because it can replace Iranian oil in the short term or solve a global energy shock by itself, but because it can be presented as part of a hemispheric strategy: more crude close to the United States, greater participation by American companies, less dependence on hostile producers, and greater leverage over migration and regional security. In politics, the narrative sometimes weighs as much as the number of barrels.
That is where the main risk appears. A policy organized around oil, migration, debt, sanctions, and stability will naturally favor those who can guarantee administrative continuity. In Venezuela today, that figure is Delcy Rodríguez. The White House might present her as a transitional custodian: someone capable of keeping the state functioning, negotiating OFAC licenses that preserve tutelage, organizing the oil recovery, containing migration, and preserving the cohesion of power while conditions are built for a later election. That argument may be pragmatic. It may also be dangerous if it is not tied to a clear, verifiable, and constitutional electoral horizon for Venezuela.
A more constructive path for the U.S. Congress, especially if Democrats retake the House or even the Senate, would be to turn oversight into a tool for achieving a bipartisan policy of state. That does not mean abandoning criticism or oversight of everything that has occurred, but the alternative cannot be simply to block, denounce, or return to a policy of pressure without an exit. The goal should be to promote a grand bargain connecting three inseparable dimensions: economic recovery, political opening, and institutional reconstruction.
Venezuela needs stabilization, but it also needs rules, guarantees, and legitimacy. That is why the electoral horizon should not be built on the shortcut of criticizing Trump and merely demanding a date on the calendar to hold elections. Washington’s task should not be to exercise tutelage over Venezuela, but to facilitate —with the enormous influence it currently has— a national, constitutional, and democratic agreement that makes possible a real election capable of restoring democratic sovereignty in Venezuela. After the experience of July 28, 2024, a rushed election without minimum guarantees could reproduce the same problem: an electoral event without sufficient conditions for the result to be respected. On electoral conditions, a Democratic majority in Congress could rely on the observation reports of the European Union during the 2021 regional and local elections, and those by the Carter Center on the 2024 presidential election. Those reports offer a technical basis for a concrete agenda: reform of the electoral authority, updating the voter registry, effective participation of the diaspora, rehabilitation of parties and candidates, release of political prisoners, robust international observation, transitional justice, and guarantees for all actors.
But the language of conditions cannot become an excuse either. There must be verifiable milestones and enforceable deadlines, so that “conditions first” does not end up meaning “continuity until 2030,” the expiration date of Maduro’s contested presidential term, during which Delcy Rodríguez acts as the figure charged with managing the continuity of power. It is important to note that the Venezuelan Constitution enables that possibility in the event of the president’s absolute absence beginning in the fourth year of the current presidential term —that is, around July 2028. That is why that year must become an inflection point: not as a shortcut, but as a reasonable horizon for building conditions and preventing stabilization from turning into permanence.
There are two paths. One is transactional stabilization: oil, migration, sanctions relief, debt, and managed continuity. The other is a grand bargain: economic normalization and the total but conditioned lifting of sanctions in exchange for a verifiable roadmap toward a free, competitive, and respected election. The true catalyst is, without question, the lifting of sanctions —but only if it is tied to the creation of an electoral horizon that, within a reasonable timeframe, provides the necessary conditions.
The challenge is not to confuse these two things. Venezuela needs stabilization and economic recovery, but not at the cost of sacrificing democracy. If Washington turns Delcy Rodríguez into the guarantor of order, oil, and migration control, it will have traded democratic pressure for the administration of continuity. If, instead, it uses those same incentives to build real electoral conditions, U.S. policy toward Venezuela after the midterm elections could open a historic opportunity.
Everything will depend on whether Congress, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Europe, regional actors, the Venezuelan opposition, and civil society can impose a simple idea: no normalization should be more important than the democratic legitimacy Venezuela needs to recover. After the U.S. midterm elections this November, a critical political cycle opens within the Trump administration to achieve that before 2028, the year in which the United States will once again hold presidential and congressional elections —and, if things are done right, Venezuela could hold them as well.
*Leopoldo Martínez Nucete is an international lawyer and former Venezuelan congressman. He is the founder of the Center for Democracy and Development in the Americas (CDDA) and served as Senior Counselor at the U.S. Department of Commerce during the Biden administration.