By the IQ Latino Editorial Team
For decades, the United States presented itself as a refuge for people fleeing authoritarianism in Cuba and Venezuela. Successive administrations condemned political repression in both countries and recognized that their humanitarian crises required more than an ordinary immigration response.
That principle is now being tested.
Cubans released with I-220A documents, Venezuelans who lost Temporary Protected Status or humanitarian parole, asylum applicants and other migrants with unresolved cases increasingly fear that an immigration appointment, traffic stop or encounter near their workplace could lead to detention and deportation.
Former U.S. Representative Joe García and Venezuelan American leader Leopoldo Martínez approach the crisis through their respective communities. Their shared argument is not against border security. It is against an enforcement policy that fails to distinguish among dangerous criminals, recent border arrivals, asylum seekers and peaceful residents who relied on protections or procedures established by the United States itself.
Joe García: Enforcement is not all the same
García recently challenged one of the most frequent defenses of the current crackdown: the claim that President Barack Obama deported more people than President Donald Trump.
He does not dispute the numbers. His argument is that aggregate totals conceal important differences in whom the government targeted, where enforcement occurred and how immigrants were treated.
“Obama may have deported more men at the border, as the law required,” García said in one of his recent interviews, contrasting those removals with the pursuit of immigrants inside established American communities.
Someone recently apprehended at the border is not situated like a longtime resident detained at a workplace, gas station or scheduled immigration appointment. Nor is removing a person convicted of a serious crime equivalent to targeting someone with no criminal record who is pursuing a pending immigration case.
For García, the question is not simply how many people are deported. It is whether enforcement is targeted, lawful and proportionate.
Cubans caught in legal uncertainty
Many Cubans entered the United States, presented themselves to immigration authorities and were released with an I-220A—an order of release on recognizance—while their proceedings continued.
The I-220A is not a visa, parole or permanent status. Consequently, many Cubans who complied with check-ins, obtained employment authorization, filed asylum applications and established lives in the United States still lack a clear pathway to adjust their status under the Cuban Adjustment Act.
Their uncertainty has intensified as immigration authorities detain people during routine appointments and send some deportees to third countries.
Cubans have recently been removed to the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea, sometimes without advance knowledge of their final destination. They arrived without family, legal status or support networks, raising serious questions about safety, notice and access to legal protection.
Many Cuban Americans supported stronger border enforcement. They did not necessarily vote for enforcement operations against relatives and neighbors already living in the United States and trying to resolve their cases legally.
Martínez: Venezuelans face a parallel betrayal
Martínez warned in a January IQ Latino article that Venezuelans were being pushed into legal and humanitarian uncertainty as TPS and humanitarian parole came under attack.
Neither program grants permanent residency. But while those protections were valid, their beneficiaries were authorized to live and work in the United States. Many underwent background checks, received work permits, paid taxes and made consequential decisions in reliance on protections granted by the government.
“What is happening to Venezuelans in Doral, and more broadly to Latino migrants across the country, is not consistent with American values,” Martínez told IQ Latino.
“People who were admitted or permitted to remain legally should not be stripped of protection abruptly and then detained without reasonable time to consult an attorney, organize their lives or pursue another form of relief.”, according to Martínez.
Losing TPS or parole does not automatically mean that someone has a final deportation order. Venezuelans may have pending asylum claims, appeals or family petitions. Once temporary protection disappears, however, those without another status become vulnerable to detention—even while pursuing legitimate avenues of relief.
“National security requires background checks, effective enforcement and the removal of dangerous individuals,” Martínez said. “It does not require treating an entire immigrant community as a criminal population.”
Removals to CECOT and Africa
Venezuelans have also been subjected to extraordinary third-country removals. Carlos Téllez Sánchez, who had lived in the United States for approximately five years, was deported to Liberia after months in ICE custody, despite having no meaningful connection to that country.
The most dramatic episode, however, occurred in March 2025, when the United States transferred approximately 250 Venezuelan men to El Salvador’s maximum-security CECOT prison. At least 137 were removed under the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 after the administration accused them of belonging to Tren de Aragua.
The government presented the men collectively as dangerous gang members. Families, attorneys and independent investigations disputed many of those classifications, some of which reportedly relied on tattoos, appearance or untested intelligence.
The fundamental violation was procedural: the men were transferred into foreign imprisonment without individual hearings allowing them to challenge the accusations. Former detainees subsequently described beatings, humiliation, sexual violence and denial of medical care. Human Rights Watch characterized their treatment as arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance under international law. They were released and returned to Venezuela four months later through a prisoner exchange.
“Sending Venezuelans to a foreign maximum-security prison without hearings was not ordinary immigration enforcement,” Martínez said. “It was punishment without due process.”
From judicial review to compensation
In J.G.G. v. Trump, Venezuelan detainees challenged their threatened removal under the Alien Enemies Act. The Supreme Court ultimately held that such claims had to proceed through habeas corpus in the districts where migrants were detained—but affirmed that they were entitled to reasonable notice and an opportunity to challenge removal.
In A.A.R.P. v. Trump, the Court blocked additional removals because the government’s abbreviated notice did not provide enough time to obtain judicial review. Together, the cases established that immigration status does not eliminate the right to be heard before transfer to imprisonment abroad. Supreme Court: Trump v. J.G.G., Supreme Court: A.A.R.P. v. Trump.
Former detainees are now seeking remedies. Neiyerver Adrián León Rengel, a Venezuelan barber formerly living in Texas, filed a federal civil action seeking at least $1.3 million for alleged false imprisonment, negligence and emotional harm arising from his transfer to CECOT. DHS continues to describe him as a public-safety threat.
Other former detainees have sued the private aviation contractors that operated the flights, alleging that they participated in an unlawful transfer despite judicial instructions to return the planes and the foreseeable risk of abuse at CECOT.
A different course
For Venezuelans without disqualifying criminal records, Martínez proposes 36 months of Deferred Enforced Departure. DED would not provide permanent residency or amnesty. It would create a temporary bridge while Venezuela moves through stabilization, economic recovery and democratic transition.
For Cubans, the immediate need is legal clarity for people released under I-220A and meaningful individual review for those with pending asylum or removal proceedings.
The remedies need not be identical. The governing principles should be: distinguish genuine security threats from peaceful residents, preserve access to counsel, provide individualized custody decisions and end removals to countries where deportees have no meaningful connection or protection.
A political test in South Florida
The consequences will extend into the 2026 congressional elections.
Republicans built substantial support among Cuban and Venezuelan voters by presenting themselves as uncompromising opponents of the regimes in Havana and Caracas. The immigration crackdown creates a potential credibility problem: voters are being asked to support a party that condemns those governments abroad while detaining and deporting people who fled them.
The pressure will be most visible in Florida’s 26th, 27th and 28th congressional districts, represented by Mario Díaz-Balart, María Elvira Salazar and Carlos Giménez. All three remain electorally strong, but their districts include families directly affected by immigration enforcement.
The 27th District contest between Salazar and former television journalist Eliott Rodriguez offers the clearest opportunity for the issue to become electorally consequential. In the 28th, Giménez faces Democrat Phil Ehr in a district with a large Hispanic electorate. Even in the more securely Republican 26th, anger or disappointment could affect turnout and margins.
Democrats have an opening, but only if they avoid presenting the issue as a choice between enforcement and open borders. The more persuasive argument in South Florida is enforcement with due process: secure the border, remove people who present a proven danger, but protect peaceful families who followed government procedures.
Republican incumbents also have a choice. They can defend the administration reflexively, or demonstrate independence by demanding congressional oversight, legal clarity for Cubans with I-220A, temporary protection for vetted Venezuelans and accountability for the CECOT and third-country removals.
The crackdown is no longer only a humanitarian or legal issue; it is becoming an electoral test for South Florida’s Republican representatives. Fear and resentment among Cuban and Venezuelan families could weaken loyalties built over decades, particularly if voters conclude that leaders such as María Elvira Salazar, Mario Díaz-Balart and Carlos Giménez failed to defend their own communities. “Cuban and Venezuelan voters will remember who defended their families—and who remained silent while those families were detained and deported,” said former Congressman Joe García in a recent interview with 23YFlagger in social media, an argument that underlies his sharper challenge to the Cuban electorate: “how can it continue supporting politicians such as Salazar when their immigration policies are directly affecting the families they represent?”
Cuban and Venezuelan voters may ultimately judge not only what their representatives say about dictatorship abroad, but what they are willing to do when American immigration policy reaches their own families and neighborhoods.
The United States cannot credibly champion freedom in Havana and Caracas while abandoning due process at home. Human rights are persuasive only when they apply to allies, adversaries—and migrants alike.