Latino Debates: Colombia
There probably is not another country in Latin America where historical memory has a more central role in public debate than in Colombia. The reader might recall that on October 2nd, 2016, Colombians were consulted on whether or not they approved the Agreement to End the Armed Conflict, between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government headed by Juan Manuel Santos. Surprisingly, 50.21% of the votes rejected the Agreement, contrary to the polls’ predictions. It was a small triumph, given that 49.79% of the votes were in favor.
“Do you support the final agreement for ending the conflict and building a stable and lasting peace?”
Many analysts indicated that the outcome was the result of an electoral strategy for this plebiscite that had excessive confidence and lacked mobilization, on behalf of Santos’ government. Others said that the close result ratified a tendency, according to them, increasingly deep and decisive in Colombian political life: the polarization between large blocks of left and right.
Other interpreters, perhaps in a more accusatory way, warned that Santos’ government’s neglect or strategic error was precisely on the last point. Instead of preventing a debate that should have focused on the decision to live in peace after six decades of conflict, the debate became another stage for an ideological debate of a general nature.
Without a doubt, polarization found a basis in the controversial reading of some aspects of the agreement, which were presented as a beyond-tolerable forgiveness. Particularly, the full reinsertion of guerrilla leaders into the political life, a subject to which the powerful and influential figure of former president Alvaro Uribe Vélez knew how to take advantage of.
As expected, many delicate subjects are involved in the debate of historical memory. Nonetheless, the crux of the matter is—several important academics and analysts describe—whether the political violence that has bloodied Colombia’s public life for the last six decades, should be understood as an aggression by armed groups, inseparable from terrorist and drug trafficking practices, which have acted against the rule of law; or if it should be understood as a civil war that takes place within the framework of a response of the oppressed towards their oppressors. And between these two interpretations, there is a number of other numerous variants, resulting in an even more variegated public opinion consideration.
Among the thorniest readings are those that allude to an existential network woven throughout the years between the illicit drug trade and the insurgent groups, or at least some of these. As a reminder, at least two important armed insurgent movements, the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), continued to be in conflict with the State after the process of pacification attempted by former President Cesar Gaviria (1990–1994) through the Constituent Assembly, which demobilized and incorporated the powerful M-19 to the democratic life. The uncertainty about the pacification process and the sanctuary offered by the Nicolás Maduro regime to sectors of the Colombian guerrilla group—mainly the ELN—in Venezuelan territory, are certain dangers that threaten the stability of the region. Above all, it is necessary to recognize the impact that the economy of drug trafficking has, which penetrated governmental, judicial, and military sectors throughout the region.
This confrontation, this fight for historic and socio-political recounts, is not limited to the analysis of what has lately happened, but goes back to the very origin of the conflict. According to the remarkable report presented by the National Center for Historical Memory’s Memory and Conflict Observatory, between January 1, 1958, and July 31, 2018, 262,197 people lost their lives: 215,005 civilians and 46,813 troops. The number of victims—not only those murdered, but also those injured, disappeared, displaces, families that lost their homes and properties, kidnapped, raped or abused in some way—adds to almost 8 million, according to other qualified sources.
It is not enough to point out that the society is divided in regards to the agreement. The panorama is more complicated because of the recent attacks of the ELN—whose military force has lately grown from 1300 to 1900 armed people—, the emergence of dissident groups of the FARC that will not accept the agreement, and the constant action of the numerous groups dedicated to the production and distribution of cocaine and other drugs. All this agitates the fears of a considerable part of Colombian society, which distrusts negotiation approaches and presses for a policy focused in police, military, and judicial repression.
Furthermore, the systematic killing of social leaders is another disturbing reality. Between 2002 and the first quarter of 2019, almost 800 social leaders, specially ones, have been killed by armed groups that either try to appropriate the lands, propose controlling the zones for their criminal activities, or need to ‘free’ up space to cultivate coca or mine. Some of these crimes have occurred in areas abandoned by the FARC upon the signing of the 2016 pacts, and have been occupied by new violent groups.
These acts, to some extent, hinder the fulfillment of peace agreements, which cover a series of issues such as the deposition of weapons, political participation, integral agrarian development, the eradication of illicit drugs, the definition of who are the victims of the conflict, among others.
Judging the criminals
The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) was created from the agreements as a transitional justice mechanism responsible for judging the members of the FARC, the Colombian State forces, and other citizens who have participated in the conflict, until November 24, 2016. This “special justice” believes that some crimes committed are too serious and qualify as crimes against humanity, which cannot be subject to pardons or amnesties. The action of the JEP should guarantee the right of the victims to justice. Usually, these mechanisms of transition and pacification emphasize in the moral and economic reparation of the victims, instead of the criminalization of the protagonists of the conflict.
On March 11th, the Justice Department of the Presidency of the Republic presented before the Congress the document that contains objections to 6 of the 159 articles of the Statutory Law of Special Jurisdiction. President Ivan Duque has insisted that these objections refer to very specific aspects, and that they do not constitute a defiance neither to the legislative branch nor to the judicial branch, much less an obstacle to the pursuit for peace. In addition to specific aspects (responsibility of perpetrators, role of the office of the high commissioner for peace, criminal action, not limiting the action of ordinary justice, extradition, among others), President Duque has reiterated a position on the burning issue of sexual crimes against children and adolescents:
“It must be made clear that sexual crimes against children and adolescents can only be tried in ordinary justice, because there can be no benefit or differential treatment in the face of such atrocity; in the face of such a despicable act that generates moral and ethical rejection of all Colombians.”
He has insisted that those who recommit criminal acts must lose the benefits they have obtained through the JEP. Also, under the same logic, the crimes committed after the agreements must be tried in ordinary justice. Some of the sponsors of the agreements and the JEP have reacted by denouncing the objections of the Executive Power as an attempt of blockage, an act of bad faith towards those who laid down their weapons, as an attempt to alleviate the responsibilities of government agents. This panorama is evidence of the high level of polarization that now impacts Colombian public affairs.
The fact that Colombia, a country with over 45 million inhabitants, has been able to sustain a moderate growth midst political turmoil is surprising. According to the International Monetary Fund, the economy will grow 3.3% in 2019, third to Chile (3.8%) and Peru (3.4%). Between 2011 and 2016, the tendency was decreasing, until 2017 when it reserved to positive. Many analysts believe that, closer to 2021 or 2022, the economy could grow even more, and reach rates between 4 and 5%. That growth will depend on a series of factors, not all under the control of authorities, like international oil or coffee prices. Other variables do depend on the government’s management and the agreements that can be managed in Congress: auctions in the energy sector, State regional investments, and a new royalty regime that will increase investments in municipalities.
The National Development Plan 2018-2022
The National Development Plan 2018-2022 (PND) titled “Pact for Colombia, Pact for Equity,” assumes over $354 billion investments. Based on three pillars—legality, entrepreneurship, and equity—, it proposes a GDP growth from 3.3 to 4.1%, creating 1.6 million new jobs, and increasing investment from 22 to 25.7%.
The Pact, which is aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals 2030, contains 25 “transversal pacts.” These describe actions in matters of sustainability; science, technology and innovation; transportation and logistics; digital transformation; quality and efficiency of public services; mineral and energy resources; as well as pacts in social areas, such as building peace, equal opportunities, inclusion for disabled people, women equality, and effective public management.
If this large network of policies works, 47% of investments are destined for programs to close the social breach. The established goals are extraordinary: help 1.5 million people overcome extreme poverty and an additional 3.4 million to overcome poverty altogether, in four years. Refurbish 600 thousand homes and expand higher education to 60%, so over 330 thousand youth from poor households can attend university for free. Even in terms of unemployment it is expected to reduce the unemployment rate from 12.3 to 7.9%, which would be a milestone in the country’s economy that has historically suffered from an employment demand that exceeds its supply.
If Colombia reaches pacification in this complex conjuncture that it is going through, the peace fiscal and economic divided will be an important boost for its economy. The Colombian State spends 3.7% of the country’s GDP in military spending related to the conflict—the highest in relative terms in Latin America. Take a couple of points from this type of GDP spending towards infrastructure, together with the associated expense of the post-conflict reparations, and undoubtedly it will be a very positive element for the economy and development of Colombia—in addition to the security and certainty that the pacification already brings.
Four additional challenges for Colombia
In addition to exploring the state of the Colombian Peace Agreement and the National Development Plan, I would like to highlight four other challenges that rely on the Colombian government and organized society. First, the alarming increases in cocaine production in the country. Out of the 78 thousand hectares reported in 2012, production has increased annually at high rates. In 2017, 209 hectares were used for production—almost having tripled in just five years. In a CNN en Español coverage, they illustrated it by equaling it to 253 thousand soccer fields. The United States and other countries have publically expressed worries for the phenomenon known as “the return of cocaine to Colombia.” On April 11, following his characteristic accusations, Donald Trump attacked the governments of Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador for the increase in drugs and criminals entering the United States.
Another controversial topic refers to whether or not Colombia will authorize fracking techniques for the production of hydrocarbons. Just like in other countries—Argentina, Germany, and France—, many legislators reject such law because of the environmental consequences the method produces. Numerous sectors, including President Duque, oppose this law and are mobilizing against its approval. However, a commission of independent experts recommended, in February, to advance in “integral pilot programs,” under the consideration of certain technical parameters, in a small number of wells in the Magdalena Medio region.
Fracking promoters promise luring results. Currently, Colombia produces almost 900 thousand barrels per day, which would increase by 50% and reserves could even triple. This would allow Colombia energy self-sufficiency for three decades. Nevertheless, warnings against this practice surpass environmental concerns, such as the contamination of water resources; there would also be negative social impacts—delinquency, drugs, and prostitution—in the areas where those explorations would take place.
The third challenge is the migratory Venezuelan avalanche, which is not stopping, and threatens to continue in the next weeks and months. I have had the opportunity to listed to various demographers and economists who have evaluated the phenomenon. They conclude that that migration is not transitory; that it is not distributed in big cities, but in hundreds of towns and small and mid-size cities. So far, the presence of Venezuelans in the labor market has not negatively impacted unemployment reduction. According to experts, the chief problem is the impact that more than 1.1 million people could have on health services, which could demand extraordinary investments, which were not anticipated in either 2017 or 2018.
This Colombian-Venezuelan migration has a precedent that must be emphasized: From the seventies decade to that of the nineties, Venezuela received a large number of the Colombian population. Most of them were displaced fleeing conflict and poverty towards a Venezuela socio-politically stable and living through a relative prosperity driven by the oil economy. Without a doubt, Venezuela was able to take on that migration, precisely because of that prosperity oil offered, while still facing difficulties of a demographic explosion. Today, those migrants are now part of the human contingent that today returns to Colombia given the Venezuelan crisis, along with thousands of Venezuelans.
Finally, the fourth point is the economic-commercial relationship between Colombia and Venezuela. Trade between the two countries reached $6 billion annually, becoming each other’s second commercial partner, after the United States in both cases. That is drastically chancing. In addition to the growing presence of China in the region, Venezuela’s economic collapse has left Colombian businesses without a billionaire market, which was accumulating a trade surplus against Venezuela in this large exchange. In good economic cycles, oil systematically strengthened the Venezuelan currency, which improved the trade terms for the Colombian economy, for being more diversified than the Venezuelan one.
Beyond the critiques some sectors have made in relation to specific aspects of the PND—critiques that enrich the debate and visions at play—, and the positions that each of the topics that we have referred to in this tight synthesis generate, what matters in the case of Colombia is to determine what the role of the dialogue and the agreement in the formulation of public policies; or if instead the growing political polarization will impede, specially in Congress, a legal framework needed for the execution of the PND from passing and, in a broader sense, the laws and agreements that the advancement of the country demands.
The set of highlighted issues in this text serves to recognize that the destiny and success of both Colombia and Venezuela go hand in hand. Namely, the population or migration matter resulted from the crisis in Venezuela, the decreasing size of trade between the two countries, the complex network between drug trafficking and the political links between the Colombian insurgents with the Venezuelan regime. Nothing can positively advance in either Colombia or Venezuela until a fruitful agenda of integration and cooperation framed in sustainable democratic forms is set for both countries.