By Andrés Rojas Jiménez
Leopoldo Martínez is a Venezuelan lawyer and was a representative in the National Assembly of Venezuela. He emigrated, became a naturalized U.S. citizen, became member of the National Committee of the Democratic Party in the United States and served as Counselor at the U.S. Department of Commerce during the Biden Administration. It is clear that he has a stance that is opposed to President Donald Trump and criticizes two recent measures involving Venezuela: the revocation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Venezuelan migrants and the decision to give a deadline until April 3 for Chevron to cease its operations in the mixed companies in which it has a minority stake with Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).
On his account on the social network X @lecumberry, he spoke out against General License 41A from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury, a position that has earned him both supporters and detractors, especially within the Venezuelan-American community.
AR: Donald Trump, in the short time he has been president in his second term, whenever he refers to the measures he is adopting, says he is correcting the mistakes of the Joe Biden administration, an argument he also uses to explain General License 41A. Is this a return to the maximum pressure policy he adopted in his first term to promote political change in Venezuela?
LM: The first thing to say is that the revocation of Chevron’s license, and who knows if any other licenses granted in the last two years, such as the so-called comfort letters under which European companies were operating and are not subject to licensing requirements, could indeed be related to a policy of secondary sanctions.
All of this is happening amidst great uncertainty because the truth is that the initial approach of the Trump administration was in a direction 180 degrees different from this latest decision. In fact, when Richard Grenell, Presidential Special Envoy for Special Missions, traveled to Caracas to release and bring back six Americans who were unjustly detained in Venezuela, he did not address any issues related to the transition to democracy and only focused on the deportations of Venezuelans. At that moment, I said that the bipartisan consensus on the situation in Venezuela was abandoned by the Trump administration.
AR: Why?
LM: On one hand, because the negotiations and bilateral approaches with (Nicolás) Maduro were not part of a policy aimed at building democracy, and on the other hand, due to the inhumane treatment given immigrants by the Trump administration. Then this sudden shift occurred, which I believe is related to internal dynamics within the coalition supporting President Trump. Following Grenell’s statements, in which he said that Trump’s policy was not about regime change in Venezuela but simply about building a new relationship.
As often happens in politics, I think he went beyond what was politically acceptable to say, which produced a clearly expected reaction from the State Department, with Marco Rubio at the helm, and of course, from the Republican representatives from Florida who focus on Venezuela in their discourse.
Therefore, I am not sure there is a clear policy regarding what will happen next or if there will be a return to the maximum pressure approach of 2019. Rather, I believe there was a reaction to what Grenell said, which perhaps exceeded acceptable bounds and touched on issues that had been waiting for a moment when President Trump would pay attention to political considerations.
Trump is navigating the need to pass a legislative package related to the budget and fiscal policy, which is his true priority at this moment as he faces these two years of his term. In the House of Representatives, the Republican majority is narrow, reduced to just four votes, of which only three might remain because one of those votes belongs to Congresswoman Elise Stefanik, who has been appointed as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and will need to leave the House.
Coincidentally, the Florida delegation not only includes the three votes from María Elvira Salazar, Carlos Jiménez, and Mario Díaz-Balart but could also include additional votes supporting any negotiation position aimed at preserving a political narrative for the constituents in southeastern Florida, who are extremely sensitive to what may happen regarding Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and other challenging issues in Latin America. It is not easy to conclude what will happen.
AR: Those three lawmakers you mentioned in your message on social media X said they had influence in achieving General License 41A. Was there discomfort from them regarding what Grenell expressed?
LM: As I said, I believe the statements went a bit beyond what was tolerable for them and were made in the midst of a very significant crisis that arose due to the revocation of TPS for Venezuelans. The level of tension and irritation regarding that measure in Southeast Florida is substantial because we are talking about a population of nearly 400,000 Venezuelan migrants who are protected by that temporary immigration status.
These are people who are deeply integrated into the economy of the United States and have no ties to crime or delinquency whatsoever. They are families with children in schools, they are part of the community, they run small businesses, and they have bought or rented the properties where they live in Florida or Texas. They have a lot of affection from the community, not only from American citizens of Venezuelan origin but from the entire Latino community in the country, particularly in Florida. I believe that decision was leading these three lawmakers into difficult waters. Additionally, I would dare to say that President Trump’s Cabinet Secretary, Susie Wiles, who is a woman from Florida, also played a key role.”
AR: Could these legislators threaten not to vote for the budget?
LM: More than a threat to say they wouldn’t vote for the budget. Grenell’s statements opened a point of entry or conversation to the Chief of Staff, whose job is to ensure that the things the president wants to do get done; and she must have said something in that direction. The despicable thing about all this is that the Florida legislators and those who orchestrated this measure considered the alternative between choosing to restore TPS (Temporary Protected Status) and revoking Chevron’s license. It is cruel and irresponsible to have chosen the revocation of Chevron’s license amidst complete or absolute uncertainty about what the true policy is and what the path to democratic construction in Venezuela looks like.
AR: What were the effects that should have been considered in each of those measures?
LM: As I said earlier, because it exposes more than 400,000 well-intentioned, hardworking and law-abiding Venezuelans here in the United States to deportation. In contrast, the effect of eliminating Chevron’s license is clear and obvious due to its impact on the Venezuelan economy. It causes me a bit of critical spirit when I hear those who say that Venezuela’s economic problem is not the result of economic sanctions. It is clear that Venezuela’s economic problem is the result of over two decades of mismanagement in handling the economy, destruction of trust, erosion of the rule of law, and lack of conditions for the private sector to operate. However, obviously, economic sanctions also become a concurrent cause of the economic problem.
AR: What do you say to the position many Venezuelans have, like yourself, who also hold U.S. nationality but sympathize with or voted for President Trump and applaud the revocation of Chevron’s license because they see it as a measure that will foster political change in Venezuela?
LM: That is a fantasy. There are also important voices from the Venezuelan political opposition echoing that argument, but notice that this did not happen between 2019 and 2022; rather, everything went in the opposite direction and strengthened Maduro’s government. This has not occurred in other countries either, which have had many more years of U.S. economic sanctions aimed at promoting regime change. Therefore, I pose two questions, which I included in my message on X. The first: what is the impact of this measure on Venezuela’s private economy? In the past, it has not been so much the regime that has been impacted but rather Venezuelan civil society, ordinary citizens, and the private sector of the economy. If we analyze Chevron’s license design, there has never been a situation where an oil multinational—in this case, a U.S. company—operated under such beneficial terms with such laxity and financial margin as Chevron was operating in Venezuela.
AR: The argument from those supporting revocation is that Chevron’s money was going to Nicolás Maduro.
LM: The biggest upside was for the private sector because the license dolarized the economy. The flow of foreign currency generated by Venezuelan oil activity linked to this company was circulating directly through the private sector and not through Venezuela’s Central Bank as occurred with Chevron. Therefore, if there was a sector in Venezuela that was benefiting most from Chevron’s presence in the country, it was that resilient productive private sector without which it is impossible to think about rebuilding the country or facilitating a return to democracy and a more prosperous society.
AR: You mentioned you posed two questions. What is the second one?
LM: From an American perspective, who will replace Chevron?
AR: In your message on X, you said it would be Russia or China, which aligns with what Chevron’s CEO Mike Wirth expressed a couple of weeks ago.
LM: It could be Russia or China or a combination of distant nature actors, perhaps antagonistic with U.S. national security interest and democracy building in Venezuela. Things in Venezuela could not break down as some expect in the short term after the departure of Chevron and others operating under OFAC license. The path toward democracy, a market economy, and encountering a more prosperous society becomes complicated. I believe we need to engage in strategic reflection on this from both perspectives: U.S. strategic interests and its influence on Venezuela’s future as well as another fundamental bastion for reconstruction and seeking democratic alternatives in the country: Venezuela’s productive private sector. I think no one wants to talk about this because passions dominate, but I added in my message on X about Venezuelans remaining in the country from that private sector connected to irrigation benefits and economic possibilities who could lose opportunities they have been working hard on resiliently building over recent years. On another note, there’s that immense contingent of Venezuelans who could lose their immigration status and are sending money back home to their families. In absence of a policy, revoking Chevron’s license is placed into a vacuum of strategy and could be something terrible for Venezuelans. Although it generates passions and excitement for many people, it’s worth asking: Is this a hard blow for Maduro or are we stepping into some kind of Pandora’s box where everything could end up being worse for democratic causes—the construction of a society where there’s space for a private sector which is fundamental in a democracy and prosperous society.
This interview was originally published in Spanish by Bitácora Económica