It is time to address Cuba on our Latino Debates series. Coincidently, it comes in the middle of the controversy originated from the inexplicable comment Senator Bernie Sanders made in the context of his campaign for Democratic presidential nominee. Sanders claimed alleged positive elements of the Castro regime, based on the also supposed achievements of literacy programs at the beginning of the Cuban revolution. These programs, in the end, served as a mechanism of indoctrination and political oppression.
Sanders responded to questions from the prestigious journalist, Anderson Cooper. Cooper required the Senator to explain comments he had expressed in the past about Fidel Castro (around the late 70s and early 80s). Instead of turning the page by saying that, at this point, in 2020, there is no doubt that the Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro resulted in a tremendous political scam, which imposed a dictatorial, oppressive, and bloody repressive regime that caused immeasurable hurt to Cuba and the Cuban people, the pre-candidate decided to relive a controversy that calls into question his judgement about Cuba. The matter, of course, has created a marked distance between Sanders and the other Democratic candidates, as well as an energetic and unequivocal rejection from the entire Democratic Party leadership in Florida. This controversy is the framework in which the publication of this article takes place.
Like I have told before, the matter of Cuba is very close to me. My grandfather, José Nucete Sardi, was the Venezuelan ambassador in Cuba twice, and he was in charge of handling historical events. The first, in 1948, as part of the stellar rise of Romulo Gallegos to the presidency of Venezuela (the first president elected by the direct and secret popular vote), to witness—with excitement, since it was about another social-democratic peer and decades-long friend— the election of Carlos Prío Socarrás. The overthrow of Romulo Gallegos prevented my grandfather from continuing his work. Later, in 1952, Fulgencio Baptista raised to power after a coup d’etat, which resulted in a markedly corrupt dictatorship.
My grandfather had to go back to Cuba as ambassador in 1959 under Rómulo Betancourt’s presidency when Venezuela reached democracy once again, leaving behind the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez. The position coincided with the rise of the Cuban revolution, during the times of its first two presidencies: those of Manuel Urrutia Lleó and Osvaldo Dorticó Torrado. It was José Nucete Sardi who had to break Venezuela’s diplomatic relationship with Cuba when Fidel Castro’s true intentions appeared in his 1959 meeting with Rómulo Betancourt during his visit to Caracas. From there, it was my grandfather’s responsibility to manage that relationship in frank deterioration until its breakup in 1961.
That historical-family link with the Cuban issue shaped my agenda when I was a parliamentarian in Venezuela. I always thought that a diplomatic and economic opening with Cuba was important while actively pressing for democratization and respect for Human Rights, as a necessary condition of the benefits of greater economic cooperation for development (just like the approach the former President of Venezuela Carlos Andrés Pérez had when he re-established the relation with Cuba in Venezuela during his first presidency 1974-1979). Quite the contrary, Chavismo built a very expensive subordination to the Cuban regime, which I denounced and accounted for in detail, when challenging the terms of the cooperation agreement between Castro and Chávez, during my tenure as a congressman in Venezuela.
But let’s focus on the present and future of Cuba. On April 10, 2019, the new Constitution of the Republic of Cuba entered into force. If every constitutional text is, by its nature, a decisive document in the life of nations, this particular constitution, drawn up by the regime in power for more than 61 years, must be read with extreme care. It allows extracting some conclusions in many ways, especially what could be the destiny of the people and families of Cuba in the coming years.
The Preamble, in essence, is a tribute that the revolution makes to its past. There is talk of heroism, patriotism, struggle against imperialism, Martí, epic resistance, proletarian internationalism, the Moncada Revolution, Marx, Engels, Lenin, the leadership of the Cuban Communist Party, Fidel Castro, and other related issues. Article 1 defines Cuba as a socialist state. Article 4 says: “The defense of the socialist homeland is the greatest honor and the supreme duty of each Cuban.” And it adds: “Betrayal of the Fatherland is the most serious of crimes, whoever commits it is subject to the most serious sanctions. The socialist system that endorses this Constitution is irrevocable. Citizens have the right to fight by all means, including armed struggle, when no other recourse is possible, against anyone who attempts to overthrow the political, social, and economic order established by this Constitution.” Article 5 ratifies the Communist Party as “the leading political force of society and the State.”
These and other articles in chapter 1 (titled Fundamental Principles), as well as the whole text, point to six principal ideas: one, there is a heroism that has the category of national principle, which is the revolutionary heroism; two, José Martí and Fidel Castro are their role models and fathers of the Homeland; three, the goal of the socialist state is to move towards communism; four, the Cuban Communist Party is the predominant institution of society; five, this structure is immovable and will never change; and finally, any dissent or rejection of this order will be considered and punished as treason. With this, I want to say that the new Constitution primarily promises Cuban society that things will remain as they have been until now.
Cuba’s population is close to 11.5 million people. This makes it the most populous country in the Antilles. Its territory reaches 110,860 square kilometers. It is not easy to determine the economic and social realities of Cuban society, which is one of the purposes of this series, because it is difficult to find reliable indicators regularly. On the one hand, there is abundant literature that denounces the Cuban regime but does not provide more information. On the other hand, the government maintains a simultaneous practice of informing and misinforming: it publishes data on the issues that perform well, but hides, delays, or manipulates those that reveal poor achievement—especially in the field of economics and social statistics.
In the report “The Cuban economy: situation in 2017-2018 and perspectives for 2019,” the eminent student of Cuban economy, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, referred to this fact, regarding the “Economic and Social Study of Latin America and the Caribbean 2018”: of the 35 indicators that allow evaluating economic behavior, the data provided by Cuba has only ten. In the material in question, Mesa-Lago shows through examples, the contradictory, confusing, and elusive use made of official statistical information.
On January 1, 2019, the Cuban Revolution turned 60. In videos, articles published in the Gramma newspaper, and official speeches, they emphasized the memory of the struggle against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the inspiring image of José Martí, and the visionary character of Fidel Castro. Significantly, the central act was carried out in a cemetery: that of Santa Ifigenia, where the remains of Fidel Castro rest. The primary speaker, first secretary of the Communist Party, Raúl Castro, in addition to attacking Donald Trump, stressed the so-called economic war, which concentrates the expectations of the Cuban people. His speech can be understood as a call to prepare for worse times.
The balance of Castroism after 60 years in power is sobering, painful, and heartbreaking. The creation of the ‘new man’ was not achieved; an independence statute was not conquered, but stages of economic dependence. First, they relied on the Soviet Union—especially since 1971, when Cuba joined the Council of Mutual Economic Aid, promoted by Russian communists to organize their countries satellites. More recently, it depended on Venezuela with a very curious feature: the subsidized country (Cuba) imposed a form of political subordination to the nation that provided the subsidizing resources (Venezuela).
The Cuban promotion of guerrilla movements in Latin America resulted in an expensive chapter of failures, which cost many lives and losses of various kinds. Its economic megaprojects, each announced with ubiquitous propaganda campaigns, at the command of Fidel Castro as chief conductor did not meet the expectations. Among them are the sugar sapphires, the “great cattle emporium,” which would turn Cuba into a global coffee exporter, “the biotechnological revolution,” the extraordinary feeding programs, and many more. At times, worse than not meeting expectations, these programs failed and were never mentioned.
Often, people talk about the successes that the Cuban regime claimed to achieve in social matters. As Carmelo Mesa-Lago explains in “The state of social welfare in Cuba” (2017), in 1989, there was a substantial change in the trend, after the collapse of the countries of the socialist bloc (the fall of the Berlin Wall occurred in November 1989). Until that moment, the “Cuban social welfare indicators exceeded those in several of those countries and led most of Latin America: universal and free education and health care, low open or visible unemployment, relatively equal income distribution (although less than in 1980), 17% higher than the median real wage in the state sector in 1980, and distribution of rationed food at subsidized prices (but lower quantities than in 1980); only in housing did Cuba lag well behind. This was possible by the government commitment and the strong economic aid of the Soviet Union: US$65 billion over the 30-year period 1960– 1990. Out of the total aid, 60.5% was not repayable (donations, price subsidies, automatic credits to cover annual trade deficits), and only 39.5% were loans, of which Cuba paid only 1.9% (Mesa-Lago, 2003).”
In just over six decades, two conclusions that appeal to different sources can be derived: the economic model of the fully centralized and state-run economy never prospered, and as a consequence, poverty in the nation worsened. Testimonials, including videos made by citizens with their mobiles, show a country with a very deteriorated infrastructure, houses in almost ruinous conditions, and multiple signs of a life that takes place in very precarious material conditions. The stories that circulate on social media or that Cubans tell in exile would occupy hundreds of thousands of pages to share here.
From the moment Raúl Castro assumed power, in 2008, he took measures to introduce some oxygen into the dwindling economy. Most importantly, they authorized the development of some private productive activity, under the figure of the so-called ‘self-employed.’ However, this did not mean they were changing the model. Still, people were allowed to acquire property, and the law was changed to stimulate foreign investment. Although the benefits of these measures do not seem to have influenced the change in the general trend, the reforms, coupled with the shift in political leadership by generational replacement, offered a window of opportunity, especially since the Venezuelan oil subsidy has collapsed along with The economy of Venezuela. Although most companies remain the property of the State, cooperatives—private—and self-employed workers operate subject to controls that hinder initiative and growth. Its emergence was and is an invitation to the empowerment of civil society. For that reason, it still makes sense to rethink, from the American perspective, the opportunities that exist to induce more significant changes in Cuba. For one, cease the political isolation and the economic embargo that has come back to fruition since President Trump backed off from the opening that President Obama started.
Returning to the economic radiography: Agricultural and livestock activity, although it employs almost 18% of the population, only represents less than 4% of GDP. That is, their productivity levels are very low. The percentage of uncultivated agricultural land is close to 60%. Sugar production in recent years, which ranges between 1.1 and 1.5 million tons, is far, far away, from the almost 8 million tons per year of the 1970s.
Something similar has happened with citrus production. The fabulous production it once had, of almost 800 thousand tons in 2001 and 2002, decreased to less than 100 thousand tons. In the years 2018 and 2019, there has been an even more pronounced decline, down to 40 thousand tons. The situation of fishing and aquafarming is more stable: it has been producing between 55 and 60 thousand tons per year, mainly for export. Amid these challenges, tourism is the only industry that has maintained growth indicators in the last five years, with revenues of more than 3 billion dollars a year, from 2015 to now. It is not yet possible to know if the measures dictated by the Trump administration during 2019—which includes restrictions on sending remittances, certain bank transactions, and trips to the island—have caused a significant impact on tourism earnings.
An inevitable conclusion is that Cuba has failed to stabilize production under the imperatives of the centralized economy. Important achievements of previous decades have not been able to sustain. Not even in mining, as in the case of nickel, whose exports fell to a third between the years 2010 and 2016. All of the above derives, mainly, from the fact that the country must import between 72 and 75% of the food it consumes. It is undoubtedly a very high figure for a country with an economy that has not managed to take off, and that has depended, to a large extent, on the support of other countries. In addition to receiving assistance first from the Soviet Union and the satellite countries of Eastern Europe, and more recently from the Venezuela of Chavez and Maduro, in between both stages, it was awarded aids and loans, mainly from European nations. These loans, in most cases, were forgiven or simply never collected. On February 11, Reuters reported that Cuba failed to pay the Paris Club, corresponding to 2020, as a result of a very advantageous renegotiation of the debt they had achieved in 2015.
From a decades-long perspective, the productivity increases during the seventies and eighties, with the subsidy of the former Soviet Union, extended to the health system and the investments in the educational system. At the time, experts and multilateral organizations recognized both trends. However, the successive economic debacles have had consequences, and one of them is the deterioration of health services, which was one of the social and political emblems exhibited to try to legitimize the revolution for over twenty-five years. Cuba exported health professional services to Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, which was a significant source of income. Nonetheless, that exchange was always marked by a certain spirit of political cooperation between governments or leaders of these countries. The political changes in Latin America and the economic collapse of Venezuela have substantially diminished the export of professional services of doctors and paramedics. At the start of 2020, the prospects for the Cuban economy are not encouraging, especially if to the above, we add the policies put in place by the Trump administration to punish Cuba’s economy for its support of the Nicolás Maduro regime.
After six decades of revolution, Cuba remains the most controversial issue of politics in the continent. The links of the Cuban high power with the high Venezuelan power have extremely polarized the quality and quantity of accusations made against Castroism, especially for their responsibility in the design of policies that violate Human Rights—as in Nicaragua—: practices related to repression and torture to those who oppose.
These practices, moreover, are, politically and strategically, related to the submission of the Cuban political opposition, which is silenced or imprisoned. In Cuba, in addition to persecuting and prosecuting journalists and protesters, there are limitations to internet access—one of the most restricted in the world. Together with the high cost of the service that makes it unattainable for any family, it constitutes a real difficulty for a free and democratic political exercise. Recall that in Cuba there are no private media outlets, except for some independent portals such as 14ymedio, founded by Reinaldo Escobar and Yoani Sánchez in May 2014, which has achieved readers all over the planet, despite the harassment and blockage to which He has subjected them constantly.
The relaunching of the intense debate on the issue of Cuba and, and specifically, understanding the responsibility and influence that the leadership of La Habana would have on the situation in Venezuela and Nicaragua, raises the question of which should be most relevant foreign policy strategy in order to induce changes in Cuba’s regime: whether confrontation, as President Trump has proposed or a dialogue and negotiation, as the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, suggested a few weeks ago to Venezuela’s to the leader of Venezuela’s opposition Juan Guaidó (recognized by the U.S. and other 50 countries as interim President of the country). That debate, in my opinion, imposes reconsidering the criteria that, at the time, shaped the policy of President Obama towards Cuba.
Since the Cuban revolution has been an immense failure, affecting the lives of millions of people, I am among those who think that one of the fundamental questions is how to provide international support to Cuban civil society and people to alleviate their shortcomings and extreme needs. Meanwhile, promoting a democratizing change that leads the country along a path of socio-economic growth and development.
Undoubtedly, the United States is a central protagonist, due to its weight and geographical proximity, in the possible future of Cuba. We cannot ignore the political and economic weight that six decades of the economic embargo have had. Similarly, we must have present the ups and downs of the complicated dependent relationship that existed between the United States and Cuba after the Spanish-American War of 1898 (also called the Cuban War)—a detonating episode and part of the struggle for Cuba’s independence, which began in 1895. The influence represented by the so-called Cuban exile is also admirable. Amid the uprooting and pain of its country, it has been able to build an economy, a way of life, and articulation within American society, especially, but not exclusively, in the city of Miami, Florida.
I have no doubt: President Obama was right in the effort to open a new chapter. It can be criticized for needing to establish more conditions, but it is also necessary to recognize that, if imposed, instead of passing through a gradual opening, it would never have been possible to take the step and try something different from isolation and embargo that, in 60 years, did not deliver on the promised results.
That route must be explored, retaken, even as a window to influence the changes demanded by Venezuela and Nicaragua, whose regimes maintain a political dependence on Havana. In no way does this reduce the accusation of the debacle of the Cuban revolution and the categorical condemnation of the constant violations of Human Rights. But it is interesting to observe and compare the policy of the United States towards China and Vietnam, two countries of the neo-communist orbit, where Human Rights are also violated, and with which it maintains diplomatic and economic relations. Does anyone question that maintaining these relationships, despite historical and political differences, has been better than no relationship?
Addressing the debate on the possible opening towards Cuba, on how to do it, so that it benefits the Cuban society, and contributes to open the doors to a better future, is a matter of elevated and careful policy. Speeches like that of Senator Sanders do not contribute to this. It is not possible to promote a turn in the foreign policy of the United States, without the support of the Cuban-American community. Nor is it possible, after 61 years, to ignore the suffering of the Cuban people and the total breach of the promises made to them in 1959.