As the end of 2019 approaches, we put aside the impeachment against Trump and the 2020 electoral cycle, dominating political conversations, to take stock of US Latin American foreign policy, under Trump’s administration.
Let us begin with Mexico. Last week, the US House of Representatives finally ratified the USMCA (trade agreement that substitutes NAFTA). This is a crucial step. In 2016, Trump rose to power with his rhetoric demonizing Latino immigration and the commercial relation with Mexico. His administration unilaterally withdrew from NAFTA, only to concede under a different name to the fact that, beyond the trade figures and deficits, there is a shared economy among the three North American countries.
In essence, USMCA reiterates the same concept as NAFTA, but with a handful of new adjustments that could have been negotiated without the trade wars and distortions Trump created. More importantly, the negotiations could have been resolved without undermining the trust of both political and business leaders. The provisions added on to USMCA beyond NAFTA improve trade dispute adjudications, as well as some protections related to intellectual property, or labor and environmental standards. The rules of origin also intend to increase the local component of automobiles manufactured in the region from 62.5% to 75%, to qualify for 0% tariffs (unless the countries involved in the trade compensate labor equally). The new rules could potentially increase automobile prices in the US for the consumer, and it remains to be seen if there will be net employment gains in the automotive industry. But, again, these protections were all part of a set of issues that had been discussed for some years, which economic diplomacy could have reached without a network of dangerous nationalist and populist rhetoric taking over. Nonetheless, it is good to leave this tension behind in 2019 and to know that U.S, Canada, and México are trading under a free trade agreement again. However, in his erratic proceedings Trump just recently announced that he will impose tariffs on steel and other metals produced in Brazil and Argentina, because their governments have devalued their currencies, without thinking that these devaluations are the result of economic and fiscal difficulties that would be aggravated if the United States is placed in this demagogic sanctioning position to the commercial exchange, thus adding to the difficulties that both countries of South America are already going through.
Unfortunately, the Central American Northern Triangle has received less attention and cooperation resources under Trump. This lack of clairvoyance is evidence he does not understand the root causes of migration from this subregion in the hemisphere. Aggravated by the inhumane treatment of asylum seekers in the southern border, deportations and the safe third country rules and agreements are imposing standards and commitments on Central American governments, which are unlikely to be in a position to comply. In a recent interview with NTN24’s Gustau Alegret, President Bukele from El Salvador said his government wants to help but cannot serve as a third safe country compliant with human rights conventions unless the US supports the financial efforts required to carry through those commitments.
Venezuela did not find the type of speedy resolution that the Trump administration sought after it recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president and escalated sectorial economic sanctions. The country’s profound crisis continues to force thousands of Venezuelans out of the country, impacting the region and particularly Colombia at difficult political time. Meanwhile, Democrats in Congress stroke a deal with Republicans to include the Verdad Act sponsored by Senator Bob Menéndez (and other legislative measures presented by the Florida Democratic delegation in the House of Representatives) in the 2020 appropriations bill approved by Congress. For one, this could ensure more than $400 million in humanitarian aid. At the same time, it reiterates with bipartisan support that, in the context of sanctions and international pressure, it is up to the Venezuelan leadership to find a negotiated pathway to credible elections as the means to resolve the country’s crisis, differences, and stalemate. Thus, unmasking Trump’s rhetoric as an expression of improvisation and demagogy. Moreover, he led the effort to restore democracy in Venezuela through a dead-end street that brought the country to a more complex scenario.
Finally, Trump’s administration’s decision to roll-back the policy of engagement with Cuba, now confronting new sanctions based on the escalation of pressure against Venezuela, has not proven to pave the way to change in either country. Furthermore, the decision perhaps even closed an avenue for a dialogue capable of offering negotiated and concrete results to address the crisis in Venezuela. The same can be said about Nicaragua. Sadly, while oppression continues in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, this Trump administration has increased deportations of nationals from these three countries. Additionally, the administration closed the door to any possibility of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) while imposing more stringent asylum rules. For example, Republicans in the Senate pushed back on bipartisan legislation approved by the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives to grant TPS for Venezuelan migrants who flee the Maduro regime and knock on the door of the United States, in search of protection of their very violated human rights.
The context referenced above, together with the lack of a strategy to build trust and partnerships in the region, has continued to open the door to China and Russia. These governments, together with trade and investments, continue to increase their already significant influence in the hemisphere. All this is happening at a time in which inequality and social tensions are escalating. It is even affecting Chile, a country many experts believed was immune or isolated from the problems impacting the rest of the region.
The balance, then, is far from positive. To make matters worse, the result of Trump’s foreign policy in the region could have been positive, even very positive, by applying a little common sense instead of generating expectations that Trump himself aroused in some of his discursive blows. We must double down on the efforts so that 2020 is easier and more promising for the continent. Undoubtedly, it is up to US sectors that have an interest in the region (especially Latino leadership) to fulfill a pending task: build a bipartisan roadmap and, with support from various sectors of American society, prioritize the construction of an alliance that recognizes the potential that exists in this triangle of opportunities represented in the relationship between the US and Iberoamerica.