The third round of negotiations between the delegations of the 2015 and 2026 National Assemblies has produced announcements concerning political guarantees and institutional renewal, alongside questions about their scope and implementation. Assessments range from appreciation for incremental progress to skepticism over the absence of decisive commitments on an electoral horizon. The distance between what has been announced and what remains to be delivered calls for a measured and rigorous assessment.
The discussion should help clarify what results this mechanism must deliver and how compliance can be verified. Its credibility will depend on its ability to turn understandings into effective guarantees and establish a reliable electoral path. Preserving the focus of the negotiations is therefore especially important.
The delegation of the 2015 National Assembly faces a decisive responsibility: to pursue an understanding with the 2026 Assembly that establishes the institutional and political conditions for a credible election. To fulfill that responsibility, it must concentrate on a precise mandate: renewing the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and the National Electoral Council, securing guarantees for political participation, and establishing an electoral timetable that can be agreed upon, implemented, and verified.
The minimalist principle that “less is more” is particularly relevant. Many indispensable advances can be achieved through decisions that give effect to the Constitution and existing laws. Making them contingent on lengthy legislative debates or comprehensive institutional reform could delay solutions already within the authority of the relevant institutions.
Restoring opposition parties to their legitimate leadership, ending court-imposed interventions, and returning their symbols and ballot designations do not require a comprehensive reform of political party legislation as a precondition. They require decisions by the competent institutions that restore organizational autonomy and the rights of party members. The negotiations should concentrate on securing those decisions and ensuring their implementation.
Establishing a credible National Electoral Council, or CNE, should not depend on new electoral legislation either. Qualified and independent authorities can be selected through existing constitutional and legal procedures. The same applies to a reliable audit and comprehensive update of the electoral register, including effective registration and information-update drives for Venezuelans abroad within the existing legal framework. Reforms that could broaden and strengthen these guarantees will have their place, but they should not become prerequisites for fulfilling current obligations.
The release of all political prisoners and the return of all exiles with effective guarantees must also be addressed through available legal channels. The existing amnesty law must be fully applied to everyone who falls within its provisions. For those outside its scope, dismissal of proceedings, pardons, and prosecutorial action to end unfounded prosecutions should be considered according to the circumstances of each case and applicable constitutional and legal limits. These decisions must include lifting measures that prevent individuals from regaining their freedom, returning to the country, and fully exercising their rights as citizens.
Lifting all political disqualifications that prevent individuals from standing for election must form part of this same effort to restore rights, through the appropriate decisions and procedures. Freedom of association and expression, an end to persecution, the safety of candidates and voters, and conditions for credible election observation complete this core set of guarantees. They are essential to allowing Venezuelans to choose freely among options that represent them and ensuring that the results are respected.
Renewing the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, or TSJ, and the CNE requires much more than replacing individuals or allocating positions. The qualifications, independence, and credibility of their members matter, as do the procedures used to select them and the safeguards that allow them to serve without partisan subordination. Agreements must translate into verifiable obligations, clearly assigned responsibilities, and defined deadlines.
In this regard, the progress made toward renewing the TSJ deserves recognition. We should hope that the momentum and pace achieved will be sustained until a court emerges whose independence, competence, and credibility help build confidence in the transition.
This approach offers a practical way to assess the announcements from the third round: identify which commitments can be implemented immediately, which institution must act, and when those decisions should take effect. Reviewing legislation may be useful in specific areas. Such reviews should address identified legal obstacles and avoid making every solution contingent on an extensive legislative overhaul.
The delegation of the 2015 National Assembly must resist the temptation to bring additional issues to the table in response to Venezuelans’ many legitimate concerns. Restoring incomes, controlling inflation, improving public services, strengthening social protection, and creating jobs are urgent priorities. So are the major decisions concerning the economic model, national reconstruction, and international relations. Their importance requires appropriate forums, participants, and mandates to address them.
Adding these demands to the negotiations would neither confer greater legitimacy on the delegation nor demonstrate a stronger connection to the country’s needs. It could instead undermine the purpose that justifies its participation: restoring rights, securing guarantees, and opening a credible electoral path. Its legitimacy will grow through its effective contribution to restoring citizens’ ability to decide and elect those who will have a mandate to lead these transformations.
Turning this mechanism into negotiations over the entire national agenda would multiply disagreements, make institutional progress vulnerable to demands for concessions unrelated to the electoral objective, and dilute accountability for results. Maintaining discipline over the scope of the agenda is part of the delegation’s political responsibility. Its contribution will be more decisive if it delivers concrete and verifiable agreements that allow Venezuelans to reclaim the effective exercise of their sovereignty.
If additional priorities were to be incorporated, I would limit them to a specific set of appointments and adjustments essential to supporting economic stabilization while building confidence in the transition: presidents and boards of directors for Venezuela’s Central Bank and PDVSA, composed of individuals with recognized competence, distinguished records, and credibility; an independent and trustworthy comptroller general; and adjustments to executive leadership that, within the constitutional framework, strengthen government coordination and inspire domestic and international confidence in the process.
These appointments would help improve economic management, transparency, and the state’s capacity to respond as the country establishes a path toward renewing the democratic legitimacy of all branches of government through elections. The same principle should apply here: reach agreements that can be implemented through existing powers and procedures.
That would be the limit: renewing the TSJ and the CNE, securing the guarantees indispensable to a credible electoral timetable, and making these essential appointments and adjustments to support stabilization and build confidence. Not one additional task for the negotiating table. This agenda is already sufficiently complex and indispensable.
As we have argued on other occasions, lifting the economic sanctions imposed on the country in exchange for a concrete, credible, and verifiable electoral timetable could be a major catalyst for opening that electoral path. The timetable must include the appointment of a new CNE and the guarantees indispensable to effective democratic competition. International support should help structure this understanding, with reciprocal commitments, defined stages, and verification mechanisms. Linking relief from these economic sanctions to compliance with that roadmap would help align incentives for restoring institutional legitimacy and advancing economic recovery.
Lifting economic sanctions would also eliminate the complex and discretionary OFAC licensing process and other U.S.-determined directives. Combined with the exceptional legal framework operating within Venezuela, these arrangements contribute to opacity in many decisions. That opacity concerns many of us across sectors who support—although not unconditionally—the path toward stabilization, recovery, and transition being pursued during this difficult period.
The substantive agreements needed to build a democracy with economic growth, greater inclusion, national reconciliation, and sustained improvements in quality of life remain a work in progress. Their preparation should begin now through proposals and broad consensus building, with contributions from universities, civil society organizations, businesses, workers, and political parties. Their development and implementation will require institutions renewed through the popular vote and authorities with a clear public mandate.
A carefully planned electoral horizon gives this effort direction. It helps organize commitments, reduce uncertainty, and establish how the disagreements that will persist throughout reconstruction can be addressed democratically. Facilitating the transition requires opening that horizon and preparing the conditions for institutions emerging from elections to govern, reach agreements, and respond to the population’s needs.
Reactions to this third round should serve to raise expectations for results and clarify the next steps. Those who welcome the progress have reason to demand implementation; those who express doubts need concrete benchmarks against which to assess the process. A clearly defined agenda, verifiable commitments, and an explicit electoral roadmap would allow more meaningful public scrutiny of the negotiations.
The immediate task is to reach political agreements that give effect to the rules currently governing our institutions under the Constitution. Building the country’s new institutional framework will require democratic deliberation and public legitimacy. To make that possible, let us resolve our differences by embracing the letter of the Constitution and committing to uphold it.
Venezuela needs to recover the effective exercise of its sovereignty: its citizens’ ability to determine their future through institutions whose democratic legitimacy has been restored. The 2015 delegation must concentrate its efforts and political capital on securing that outcome. In these negotiations, less can be more if agreements are implemented and open the way to the transition.